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Most developmental research on Theory of Mind (ToM) - our ability to infer the beliefs, 
intentions, and desires of others - has focused on the preschool years. This is unsurprising since 
it was previously thought that ToM skills are developed between the ages of 2 and 7 years old 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Over the last couple of decades however, studies have 
provided evidence for significant structural and functional changes in the brain areas involved in 
ToM (the “social brain”) not only during childhood, but also during adolescence. Importantly, 
some of these findings suggest that the use of ToM shows a prolonged development through 
middle childhood and adolescence. Although evidence from previous studies suggests a 
protracted development of ToM, the factors that constrain performance during middle childhood 
and adolescence are only just beginning to be explored. In the current paper we report two visual 
world eye-tracking studies that focus on the timecourse of predictive inferences. We establish 
that when the complexity of ToM inferences are at a level which is comparable to standard 
change-of-location False-belief tasks, then adolescents and adults generate predictions for other 
agents’ behaviour in the same timecourse. However, when inferences are socially more complex, 
requiring inferences about higher-order mental states, adolescents generate predictive gaze bias 
at a marked delay relative to adults. Importantly, our results demonstrate that these 
developmental differences go beyond differences in executive functions (inhibitory control or 
working memory), and point to distinct expectations between groups and greater uncertainty 
when predicting actions based on conflicting desires. 
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Theory of Mind (ToM) describes our ability to infer the beliefs, thoughts, intentions, desires and 
feelings of others. It is long known that by 6-7 years old, children’s performance is at ceiling 
with standardly administered False-Belief tasks (Surian et al., 2007; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Recently, however, paradigms have been developed that 
involve more sensitive implicit measures, such as reaction times (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010; Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015), 
brain responses (Ferguson, Cane, Douchkov, & Wright, 2015a; Geangu, Gibson, Kaduk, & Reid, 
2013; Meinhardt, Kühn-Popp, Sommer, & Sodian, 2012) and eye-tracking (Ferguson, Apperly, 
Ahmad, Bindemann, & Cane, 2015b; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Rubio-Fernández & 
Glucksberg, 2012) where adults’ ToM performance is less-than-ceiling. Despite the creation of 
more advanced tests of ToM ability, only a few have investigated children beyond the middle 
childhood years into early adolescence and older adolescents (14 and older).  
Looking at studies that focused on younger adolescents, two have used tasks that 
involved participants’ understanding of belief. The first is a study by Devine and Hughes (2013), 
which involved a novel ToM reasoning task - the Silent Film task - and tested children between 
8-13 years of age. The task is a film-based analogue to the Strange stories task (Happé, 1994) 
that is well suited to exploring the ability to understand others’ beliefs in children beyond the age 
of 7. Participants were presented with short film clips that depicted scenarios involving 
deception, false-belief, and misunderstanding and were tasked with explaining the behaviour of a 
character. Performance on the task improved with age, independently of individual differences in 
verbal ability and socioeconomic status, suggesting that ToM abilities do continue to develop 
through middle childhood.  
More recently, Begeer and colleagues (2016) tested typically developing 7-13 year olds 
as well as children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) using a modified false-belief task- the 
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Sandbox task- and a visual hindsight bias task. They found that the adolescent control group, as 
well as the ASD group, showed more bias in a false-belief condition than in a memory control 
condition. According to the authors, this suggests that a tendency to prioritise one’s own 
perspective over the other is more similar among these two groups than previously reported. 
Other studies have explored the development of ToM inferences beyond childhood using 
versions of the Director task (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000), in which participants are 
instructed to move objects around a grid by a director who cannot see some objects in the 
participants’ view (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; Mills, 
Dumontheil, Speekenbrink, & Blakemore, 2015; Symeonidou, Dumontheil, Chow, & Breheny, 
2016; Zhao, Yang, & Apperly, 2018). These studies generally converge in showing that the 
ability to accommodate a speaker’s limited perspective continues to develop between childhood 
and adolescence to adulthood. Notably, Symeonidou et al. (2016), following Dumontheil et al. 
(2010), included older adolescents (14-17.9) in addition to young adolescents (9-13 years old) 
and adults (19-29 years old), which allowed them to track this developmental trajectory more 
closely. They also included a control condition that required participants to perform the same 
task in the absence of the director, having been told their instructions would only refer to items 
on slots without a back panel, controlling for general cognitive demands of the task. As was 
found in Dumontheil et al. (2010), Symeonidou et al. report that in the director-present 
condition, but not the control condition, children and adolescents made more errors than adults, 
suggesting that ToM use continues to improve between adolescence and adulthood. They also 
found that inhibitory control accounted for only some of the variance in behavioural results, 
indicating that it is a factor of developmental change in perspective-taking, but not the only one.  
Symeonidou et al. (2016) also collected eye-tracking data during the Director task, which 
allowed them to investigate the online processes that are activated while participants use 
perspective to identify the mutually-available target object. They found that participants who 
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reached for the wrong object adopted a different gaze pattern to participants who reached for the 
correct object. That is, looking first to the target and then the competitor object versus looking 
first to the competitor and then the target object. Moreover, when considering correct vs. 
incorrect trials separately, the timecourse of bias formation was the same for adults and 
adolescents. This evidence indicated that participants’ gaze patterns were based on information 
that is accessed rapidly, while the difference in outcome depended on whether participants 
adopted the speaker’s perspective.  
The version of the Director task used in these studies is widely known to be more 
challenging to adults than other versions (Hanna et al., 2003; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Heller 
et al., 2008) or than other on-line false-belief tasks (e.g. Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Ferguson et 
al., 2010, 2015b). This particular difficulty of the Director task has been attributed to the ‘third’ 
occluded object, which provides the best fit for verbal description from the participant’s own 
perspective, making it especially difficult to ignore. Indeed, Heller et al. (2016) report that 
participants show a high degree of ‘egocentrism’ when presented with stimuli from this kind of  
triples Director task, but show very un-‘egocentric’ behaviour when presented with stimuli from 
pairs Director task (as in Heller et al., 2008).1 
Generally, evidence from research that has used various versions of the Director task 
with adults weighs heavily against a model which proposes a strong egocentric-first heuristic 
(e.g. Back & Apperly, 2010; Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Heller et al. (2016) 
                                                
1 In both the pairs and triples versions of the Director task, participants hear a referring expression with a modifier 
(e.g. ‘the small candle’). In the triples version (e.g. Keysar et al., 2000), the target object is the smaller of two 
candles in common view but it is not the smallest candle visible to the participant, as there is an even smaller candle 
which the participant but not the director can see. Several replications of this study show that even adults find it 
difficult to ignore the best-fit competitor and even reach for that object (e.g. Wu & Keysar, 2007; Dumontheil et al., 
2010; Heller et al., 2016). In the pairs version (e.g. Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Heller et al., 2008), the participant sees a 
small (target) candle and a larger (target contrast object) candle, as well as a small cup (competitor) and either a 
larger cup (competitor contrast object) or irrelevant distractor. When all the participant’s information is in common 
view, it is shown that participants anticipate the target while hearing the modifier (‘small’) when the competitor 
contrast object is absent (Sedivy et al., 1999). When the competitor contrast object (large cup) is only visible to the 
participant, the prediction is that the same advantage in anticipating the target would occur if the participant can 




propose that multiple representational domains compete in processing communicative stimuli 
where uncertainty is involved, while factors such as goodness of fit of the description in an 
instruction weight one domain over the others (see also Ferguson & Breheny, 2012). Moving 
forward, the general question for adult ToM research is what constrains decisions about other 
agents’ actions. It is widely acknowledged that executive function (EF) abilities are a factor for 
adults, particularly those for inhibiting salient but irrelevant perspective information (e.g. 
Bradford et al., 2015; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Bull, Philips, & Conway, 2008; German & 
Hehman, 2006), or holding information in working memory (e.g. Cane, Ferguson, & Apperly, 
2017; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Davis & Pratt, 1996; Mills et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2010). 
However, differences in such abilities are not thought to be the only factor, with attention to 
perspective-relevant situational cues (Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Heyes, 2014; Rubio-Fernandez & 
Geurts, 2016; Santiesteban et al., 2014), and broader social or cultural factors (Bradford et al., 
2018; Ferguson et al., 2015a; Nielsen, Slade, Levy, & Holmes, 2015; Savitsky et al., 2011; Wu 
& Keysar, 2007) among the other factors cited as relevant. Results from the adolescent research 
reviewed above can be seen in this light: differences between adolescent and adult groups can be 
attributed to developing EF abilities, and abilities to attend to and process available stimuli that 
are relevant to mental state inferences. The link between EF abilities and ToM development is in 
line with research showing that some executive function skills, including inhibition and working 
memory, develop throughout childhood and adolescence, and even into adulthood (e.g. 
Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, Wearing, 2004; Van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). 
In this paper, we ask whether and how any limitations that are independent of EF abilities might 
impact on adolescents’ abilities to engage in more complex social interactions, requiring richer 
or higher-order mental inferences. In particular, we explored this question by looking at the 
timecourse of processing more complex situations. As a first step, we revisited the timecourse of 
processing less complex events. 
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As far as the application of ToM abilities go, the different versions of the Director task 
are similar to a basic change-of-location false-belief task. In both cases, the participant has to 
reason about another agent’s actions given first-order beliefs that differ to their own. To date, 
Theory of Mind in adolescents has been investigated using the triples Director task. A standard 
change-of-location false-belief task does not impose the extra demands of the triples Director 
task, due to the role of the better-fit competitor object in the latter (see footnote 1). This is borne 
out by the fact that, in the triples Director task, participants of all age groups are liable to make 
reaching errors, albeit with adolescents and older children making more than adult controls. As 
mentioned above, Symeonidou et al. (2016) report distinctive gaze patterns for the different 
behavioural outcomes and that the onset of these patterns occurs at the same time for all groups, 
very early in the instruction. They conclude that, where adolescents and adults succeed, the 
timecourse of processing ToM information is comparable. However, this conclusion is based on 
post-hoc assumptions and it also relies on sparse data regarding trials where adults made errors.  
One aim of our first experiment is to compare the timecourse of integrating perspective 
information between adults and adolescents using a task where the outcomes for adults and older 
children or adolescents are more uniform. For this purpose, we adopted the procedure used in 
Ferguson et al. (2015). This is a visual-world eye-tracking study in which participants view 
videos of change-of-location false-belief or true-belief scenarios. For adults in this task, gaze 
bias forms toward the correct location prior to the point of disambiguation, and develops in a 
steady, monotonic way toward that target. Thus eye gaze patterns are expected to be more 
straightforward to interpret than in the triples Director task. In sum, we tested whether 
developmental differences in the timecourse with which adolescents and adults use perspective 
to predict others’ actions can be detected using a sensitive eye-tracking paradigm that does not 
require explicit correct/incorrect judgements (c.f. Symeonidou et al., 2016). Moreover, the use of 
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a passive ‘look-and-listen’ design means that mental state inferences should be relatively 
spontaneous, and external demands on executive capacities should be minimal. 
 
Experiment 1 
The task used in the current experiment is adapted from Ferguson and colleagues (2015), and 
involves videos portraying true- and false-belief scenarios. Experimental videos presented two 
characters, Sarah and Jane. At the beginning of the video both Sarah and Jane are standing 
behind a table which has a target object (e.g. a pen) in the centre and three containers, one on the 
left, one in the middle, and one on the right. While Jane is watching, Sarah moves the object into 
one of the three containers. Sarah then moves the object into one of the other containers, either 
while Jane is still present and watching (true-belief for Jane) or after she has left (false-belief for 
Jane). Participants were then presented with a still image of the final scene of the video while 
they heard an auditory description such as, “Jane will look for the pen in the container on the 
[left/middle/right]”. In a TB condition the final container would be the object’s true location, and 
in the FB condition it would be the initial container. During this presentation, participants’ eye-
gaze around the visual scene (the three containers) was recorded to examine visual biases to the 
different containers.    
In addition to the main task we wanted to check whether individual difference measures 
that have previously been shown to be associated with ToM differed between groups. Here we 
tested two measures of executive function: inhibitory control (IC) and verbal working memory 
(WM). Previous studies have found an association between inhibition and the application of 
ToM inference in children (3-4 year olds in Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; 4-10 year olds in 
Hansen Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014; 4-9 year olds in Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 
2010; 2-5 year olds in Nilsen & Graham, 2009; meta-analysis of 3-6 year olds in Devine and 
Hughes, 2014), in adolescents (Symeonidou et al., 2016; Vetter, Altgassen, et al., 2013a) and in 
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adults (Bradford et al., 2015; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Bull et al., 2008; German & Hehman, 2006 
- though see Humphrey & Dumontheil, 2016). Previous research has also shown a relationship 
between working memory (WM) and perspective-taking (Cane et al., 2017; Carlson et al., 2002; 
Davis & Pratt, 1996; Lin et al., 2010; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Mills et al., 2015; Nilsen 
& Graham, 2009; Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012), with a lower WM capacity or 
increased working memory load leading to poorer performance on ToM tasks. 
Neuropsychological research has demonstrated that EF has a protracted period of development, 
which begins in early childhood (~2 years old) and continues into young adulthood, and each 
sub-component of EF develops at its own rate (Anderson, 2002; Diamond, 2013; Garon, Bryson, 
& Smith, 2008). For example, inhibitory control and working memory have been shown to 
develop throughout childhood and into adolescence or early adulthood (e.g. Conklin et al., 2007; 
Gathercole et al., 2004; Luna et al., 2004b; Van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). 
In sum Experiment 1 aims to i) replicate the adult findings from Ferguson et al. (2015), 
ii) examine whether adolescents’ expectations are affected by others’ (false) beliefs as 
spontaneously and as early as adults, iii) explore whether individual differences in inhibitory 
control or working memory are possible factors in constraining performance during online false-
belief reasoning. In line with previous studies, we also expected to see age-related differences in 




Forty-one participants took part in this study, of which 17 were adults (24-36 years old, M = 
26.9, SD = 2.93) and 24 were adolescents (11-18 years old, M = 15.53, SD = 2.25). All were 
native English speakers. The sample size for each group is comparable to the sample size per 
experiment in Altmann and Kamide (1999), and the total sample matches that used in Ferguson 
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et al. (2015)’s passive group2. Adult participants were recruited from the University College 
London (UCL) participant pool while adolescents were recruited from London schools. Data 
from three adolescents were excluded from the analysis due to insufficient eye tracking data 
(more than 50% data loss). Thus the final adolescent group consisted of 21 participants (11-18 
years old, M = 15.33, SD = 2.05). Parents/guardians of all adolescent participants, as well as all 
adult participants gave informed consent prior to taking part. This study was approved by the 
UCL Research Ethics Committee.   
 
Stimuli and design 
False-belief task The task design and stimuli were based on that used in Ferguson et al. 
(2015). Thus, the experiment employed a 2 x 2 mixed design, with belief condition (true belief vs 
false-belief) as the within-participant factor, and age group (adult vs adolescent) as the between-
participants factor. Stimuli consisted of sixteen sets of experimental videos and pictures with 
their respective auditory description in one of two conditions. The video clips and auditory 
narratives were taken from Ferguson et al (2015).  
Two different video sequences set up the two belief conditions (Figure 1). All videos 
involved a transfer event which began with the two actors (Jane and Sarah) standing behind a 
table. Videos began with three possible containers on the left, middle and right side of the table, 
and the target object in the centre of the table (note that containers and objects changed on each 
trial). In the first part of the video, Jane and Sarah were both present and Sarah moved the target 
object into one of the three containers while Jane watched. In the second part Sarah moved the 
target object into one of the other containers. Crucially, in one condition, Jane was present for 
this second transfer event which meant that Jane had a true belief about the object’s location. 
                                                
2 Note that a post-hoc power calculation showed that a minimum of 90 participants (calculated using the simr 
package in R; Green & MacLeod, 2016) would have been needed to detect a significant 2-way interaction with the 
significance level of α=.05 on 80% of occasions (as suggested by Cohen, 1988). The current sample sizes yield an 
estimated power of 41% for Experiment 1. We discuss this limitation further in the General Discussion. 
11	
	
However, in the other condition Jane left the scene after the first transfer events and was absent 
during the second transfer which meant that Jane has a false-belief about the object’s location. 
All videos concluded with Sarah standing alone behind the table and the three closed containers. 
This final scene of the video was extracted and presented as a picture after the video ended, 
during which participants heard the following single-pre-recorded sentence, “Jane will look for 




Figure 1 Visual displays depicting key events in the videos during the false-belief task. Stage 
one shows the ‘start state’ where both Jane and Sarah are standing behind the table. Stage two 
was the first part of the video where Sarah moves the target object into one of the three 
containers. In stage 3, Sarah moves the object into one of the other containers while Jane was 
present in true-belief (TB) trials or after Jane had left in false-belief (FB) trials. Lastly, in stage 4 
a picture of the ‘final state’ from the video was presented to participants while they listened to 
the audio sentence.    
 
One version of each item was assigned to one of two lists and participants were randomly 
assigned to one of these two lists. Each list contained sixteen unique experimental items, eight in 
each condition (true and false-belief). Sixteen filler trials were also included in each list to 
12	
	
prevent participants from guessing the aim of the study; videos depicted similar transfer events 
or the object was replaced into the first container, and auditory descriptions referred to either 
Jane’s, Sarah’s, a stranger’s, or reality perspective (see Ferguson et al. (2015) for full details of 
fillers). To ensure participants were paying attention, a comprehension question was randomly 
presented after half of the experimental trials and half of the filler trials (e.g. ‘The objects are 
actually in the chocolate box? True < > False’). 
 
Individual measures Participants’ inhibitory control and working memory were measured. To 
measure inhibitory control participants completed a simple and a complex Go-NoGo task, with 
trial type (Go, NoGo) as the within-participant factor. The simple Go-NoGo task was based on 
the standard Go-NoGo paradigm (Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). A coloured square 
was presented on the left or right side of the screen in each trial. If the square was green (a Go 
trial) participants had to indicate which side of the screen it appeared on. If the square was red (a 
NoGo trial) participants had to inhibit their response. The Complex Go-NoGo task used yellow 
and blue squares and included a 1-back WM requirement (see Simmonds et al., 2008). The 1-
back WM requirement was that participants had to indicate on which side of the screen the 
square was shown (Go trials) except when a blue square was preceded by a yellow square (NoGo 
trials). For analysis, we calculated the mean difference in percentage accuracy between NoGo 
trials and Go trials, and the median correct response time on Go trials, for each participant. 
Verbal WM was measured using the backward Digit Span subtest of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Third edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997).  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and completed the tasks (False-belief, Go-NoGo, Digit 
Span) in a single session of approximately 45 minutes. The false-belief task was always 
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administered first. Eye-movements during the false-belief task were recorded using a Tobii 
TX300 eye-tracker at a sampling rate of 300Hz. Stimuli for the false-belief task were presented 
using E-Prime 2 and the Go-NoGo tasks were programmed in Cogent (www.vislab.ucl.ac.-
uk/Cogent/ index.html) running in Matlab 7.0 (MathWorks).    
For the false-belief task participants were given the following instructions as in Ferguson 
et al. (2015): “In this experiment you will watch short videos, each of which will be followed by 
a still frame from that video and a spoken description of events. Your task is simply to watch and 
listen and respond to the comprehension questions when prompted”. After the instructions were 
given, the experimenter introduced the two characters (Sarah and Jane) by name by showing 
them a still image of the two characters in the first stage of the video (see Figure 1), with the 
name of each character written by the character’s side. To ensure that all participants had a clear 
understanding of which character was Sarah and which character was Jane they were tested 
before the start of the experiment by hiding the names from the picture and asking them to point 
to each character and state their name. Participants were then presented with two practice trials 
to familiarise them with the task.  
A centrally-located fixation cross was presented at the beginning of each trial, and the 
trial was initiated when participants successfully fixated it for at least 1s without blinking. The 
video was then presented which showed the transfer events described above. On average the 
videos lasted 28s (ranging from 16-53s). Each video was followed by a 500ms blank screen 
before the final state picture from the video was presented. After a 1000ms preview of the 
picture the relevant audio target sentence was presented. The picture was presented for a total of 
7000ms. The audio typically ended 1-2 s before the trial ended (see Table 1). After 50% of trials, 
a comprehension question appeared and participants selected one of two possible answers using 
the keyboard (all participants achieved at or above 80% accuracy of these questions). Trials were 




Eye-tracking data processing and analysis  
Participant’s eye movements were tracked while the target image (the ‘final state’) was on screen 
and were processed on a trial-by-trial basis relative to the respective image and sound onsets. For 
each image, three regions of interest (ROIs) were specified around each container location (left, 
middle and right). This was done by mapping spatial coordinates of fixations (in pixels) on each 
ROI, and if a fixation was located within 20 pixels of a container’s perimeter it was coded as a 
look to that object. Any looks outside these AOIs were coded as background.  
The data was then broken down into 20ms time bins and within each bin samples were 
binary coded, with ‘1’ belonging to a ROI (Reality, Belief, Distractor, Background) or ‘0’ if 
there were no looks on the ROIs. These samples were aggregated across participants and items to 
calculate visual preferences to the reality location (the object’s final location) and the belief 
location (the initial location) for seven consecutive time windows of interest. The time windows 
of interest were i) the 1000ms preview (after image onset but before audio onset), ii) “Jane will 
look for the”, iii) [object], iv) “in the”, v) “container”, vi) “on the”, vii) [location]. Table 1 shows 
the average durations per condition for the word-based time windows.  
 








 TB FB 
“Jane will look for the” 735 740 
[object] 868 879 
“in the” 210 208 
“container” 584 585 
“on the” 211 220 





For each time window a location-preference score was calculated, as in Ferguson and 
Breheny (2011, 2012) using: log(Reality/Belief) = ln (P(Reality) / P(Belief)).  P(Reality)  refers to the 
sum of looks to the reality location divided by the total number looks to all ROIs, and P(Belief)  is 
the sum of looks to the belief location divided by the total number of looks to all ROIs. The 
output of this calculation is a single value that measures the bias towards each critical location 
for each condition within each time window. As this measure is symmetrical around zero, 
positive scores show a greater bias to look at the reality location and negative scores show a 
greater bias to look at the belief location. Note that for statistical analysis eye movements were 
synchronised to the absolute word onsets and offsets on a trial-by-trial basis. The grand mean for 
the log-transformed location bias score in each condition and group was plotted to visualise the 
data (Figure 2), with eye movements resynchronized according to individual word onsets 

















Figure 2 The average log(reality/Belief) score for each condition and age group. Positive scores show a greater bias to look at the reality location 
and negative scores show a greater bias to look at the belief location. Note that the dashed and vertical lines indicate absolute onsets and average 



















Statistical analyses were carried out using mixed effect regression models for each time 
window separately: i) [preview], ii) “Jane will look for the”, iii) [object], iv) “in the”, v) 
“container”, vi) “on the”, vii) [location]. The models were fitted using the lmer function in the 
lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) using R (R Core Development Team, 
2013). The location-bias score, averaged over a given time window, was used as the dependent 
variable. Each model included belief (FB vs TB) and age group (Adolescent vs Adult) as fixed 
effects, deviation coded as -.5 vs .5, respectively. Models included the maximal random effects 
structure suggested by Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013), including random effects for 
participants and items, and crossed random slopes for belief by group on items and a random 
slope for belief on participants. Random effects were only removed where they lead to non-
convergence due to overparameterization. Significant effects of context were followed up for 
each time window using one sample t-tests to test whether the fixation bias for each context 
condition was significantly different from zero (thus indicating when participants showed a 
significant preference to fixate the reality or belief location in each condition). For all tests a 




Table 2 shows the fixed and random effects for the model adopted in each time window, and 
Table 3 displays the statistical results from the planned one-sample t-tests for each condition in 
each time window where there was a significant effect of condition. Note that as there were no 
significant interactions between belief and age group, all post hoc t-tests were collapsed across 
age groups for each condition. 
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Table 2 Estimates and t-values for each time window of interest, where * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
and *** p < .001. 
           
  Intercept Belief Age group Belief x Age group 
[Preview] 
β Est. (SE) .72 (.40) .11 (.22) -.36 (.25) .12 (.44) 
t-value 1.78 .49 -1.41 .28 
[Pre-object] 
β Est. (SE) .52 (.35) .52 (.19)  -.58 (.25)  .71 (.39) 
t-value 1.47 2.65 ** -2.35 * 1.84 
[Object] 
β Est. (SE) .65 (.36) 1.08 (.21) .29 (.30) -.65 (.41) 
t-value 1.82 5.30 *** .98 -1.59 
"in the" 
β Est. (SE) .41 (.20) 1.03 (.18) .01 (.22) -.15 (.35) 
t-value 2.00 5.85 *** .05 -.43 
"container" 
β Est. (SE) .70 (.29) 1.72 (.22) .15 (.31) -.51 (.43) 
t-value 2.93 * 7.97 *** .48 -1.19 
"on the" 
β Est. (SE) .55 (.19) 1.59 (.30) .22 (.30) .38 (.35) 
t-value 2.84 ** 9.10 *** .72 1.10 
[Location] 
β Est. (SE) .31 (.30)   2.79 (.21) -.22 (.28) .39 (.28) 
t-value 1.03 13.44 *** -.81 .95 
      
 
Table 3 One sample t-test results for each condition and time window where there was a significant 
effect of condition. 
 
 
 df t-value p-value 
[Pre-object]    
   TB 37 3.98 <.001*** 
   FB 37 .73 .47 
[Object]    
   TB 37 5.76 <.001*** 
   FB 37 -.17 .87 
“in the”    
   TB 37 5.71 <.001*** 
   FB 37 -.94 .36 
“container”    
   TB 37 7.47 <.001*** 
   FB 37 -1.00 .32 
“on the”    
   TB 37 7.59 <.001*** 
   FB 37 -1.30 .20 
[Location]    
   TB 37 8.76 <.001*** 
   FB 37 -5.01 <.001*** 
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Analyses showed no significant effects during the 1000ms preview period. However, 
during “Jane will look for the” a significant effect of belief emerged, reflecting a bias to fixate 
the reality location when participants shared Jane’s TB about the object’s location but no 
significant bias to either container when their knowledge of the object’s real location conflicted 
with Jane’s FB. Interestingly, a significant effect of age group also emerged in this time window, 
showing that adults experienced a stronger egocentric bias to fixate the reality location across 
true and false-belief conditions compared to adolescents.  
The significant effect of belief persisted throughout all subsequent time windows. Prior to 
location disambiguation, (i.e. during the [object], “in the”, “container”, and “on the” time 
windows) this reflected a significant bias to fixate the reality location on TB trials but no 
significant bias to either container on FB trials. However, once the object’s location was 
auditorily revealed during the [location] time window, participants showed significant visual 
biases to the appropriate location (i.e. the reality location when Jane held a TB about the object’s 
location, and the belief location when Jane held a FB about the object’s location).  
To summarise, the eye movement data suggest that adolescents and adults do not differ in 
the timecourse of perspective inference and use. Replicating the effects seen in Ferguson et al. 
(2015), both adults and adolescents showed significantly different visual biases between TB and 
FB conditions from the pre-object window (“Jane will look for the”), suggesting that 
participants’ expectations were influenced by contextual information about Jane’s belief as soon 
as they heard whose perspective to take. However, the significant effect of age in the pre-object 
time window suggests that adults’ initial processing was more egocentric than adolescents. In 
addition, both groups showed appropriate biases to the reality location on TB trials in all time 
windows of interest. However, although participants seem sensitive to Jane’s belief from when 
they hear “Jane” (i.e. they are not biased to the reality location), they do not seem to use this 
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perspective information until the location time window, where they begin to correctly anticipate 
reference to the belief location on FB trials. 
 
Individual differences results 
Results for one way ANOVAs comparing adolescent and adult groups on the individual 
measures are shown in Table 4. Adults and adolescents did not differ in any of the IC and WM 
measures (all p’s > .30).  
 
Table 4 Means and standard deviations of all individual measure scores and their respective one 
way ANOVA results. 
 
To further explore whether individual differences in IC and WM had an effect on looks to 
the correct target, and whether this differs depending on whether the character’s belief was true 
or false, Pearson correlations were performed separately for each condition between the average 
bias score during “container on the” and participants’ computed z-scores for IC (simple and 
complex accuracy) and WM. This time window was selected to calculate the averaged bias score 
  Mean (SD) ANOVA 
  Adolescents Adults  df F 
Inhibitory 
control 
     
Simple Go NoGo (Acc) -.08 (.13)  -.05 (.07) 1, 36 .44 
Complex Go NoGo (Acc) -.25 (.14) -.23 (.16) 1, 36 .19 
 Simple Go (RT) 385 (46) 382 (23) 1, 36 .06 
















as it immediately precedes the disambiguating information, and therefore should show the 
clearest effects of anticipation. We did not run correlations using the median Go response times 
since responses on Go trials do not require inhibitory control. The significance level for each test 
was corrected for the six correlations using Bonferoni correction (pcrit = .0083). The data from 
these six correlations is presented in Figure 3. Results showed that none of the correlations 





Figure 3 Correlations between participants’ anticipatory bias score (y-axis) and each measure of 
executive function  (x-axis), separately for the true-belief (TB, blue) and false-belief (FB, 
orange) conditions. IC: inhibitory control. 
 
Discussion 
Results from the adult participants in the false-belief task replicated Ferguson et al. (2015), with 
participants showing significantly different visual biases between TB and FB conditions from the 
pre-object window, suggesting an influence of Jane’s perspective as soon as participants heard 
whose perspective to take. As in Ferguson et al. (2015) adult participants showed appropriate 
anticipatory looks to the reality location in TB trials. For FB trials they only made appropriate 
biases to the initial location when the location was auditorily available. Crucially, adolescents’ 
data showed the same pattern as adults. Overall, the two age groups’ gaze bias developed in the 
same way over time, with the adolescents showing a sensitivity to Jane’s belief as early as adults 
did and appropriately anticipating the reality container in TB trials. Interestingly, a main effect of 
group during the pre-object window suggested that adults experienced a stronger egocentric bias 
initially than adolescents. In other words, adolescents suffer less egocentric bias, indicating that 
not only are adolescents’ performance comparable to adults here, but perhaps may actually be 
better.  
As with the eye-movement data, we did not find any global differences in IC and verbal 
WM, suggesting that our age groups were well matched on these skills. It is perhaps worth 
noting that we did not find a significant correlation between complex IC scores and the bias 
score, even in the FB condition. Such a correlation might be expected given that participants 
need to inhibit their own knowledge about reality to infer the character’s belief.3  







In sum, Experiment 1 investigated whether adolescents can reliably infer others’ (false) 
beliefs as spontaneously and early as adults. This paradigm allowed us to observe the timecourse 
of predictive gaze in a more straightforward way than in Symeonidou et al. (2016) but confirmed 
the conclusions of that paper, which is that when perspective information is integrated in 
predictive inferences, this process occurs in the same timecourse for adolescents and adults.  
As discussed above, the DT and the FB task are comparable in terms of the inferential 
complexity involved; in both cases, an inference has to be made based on a first-order belief of 
another agent, which differs from the participant’s belief. Therefore, the question remains 
whether there might a difference between adolescents and adults in a task that involves a greater 
degree of ToM inferential complexity. A task with greater ToM inferential complexity would 
require participants to predict or explain another person’s behaviour based on higher-order 
mental states – for example, beliefs about beliefs, desires about what other people believe, and so 
forth. In Experiment 2, we aim to address this issue by testing adolescents on a task that is 
arguably less demanding than the FB task in terms of EF demands, but differs in terms of the 
complexity of the ToM inference. Specifically, Experiment 2 investigates whether adolescents 
can use knowledge about a character’s higher-order preferences about other people’s beliefs 
about their own preferences (secret desires) to make complex ToM inferences and predict that 
character’s subsequent behaviour as quickly as adults.  
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we adopted the visual world paradigm from Ferguson and Breheny (2011), 
where participants were presented with two-sentence stories. The first sentence introduced a 
property of the character, such as a personal preference, and a context in which either (1a) that 
character is happy for others to know that property, or (1b) the character does not want other 
people to know about that property. Therefore, in the open condition (1a) the basic preference 
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and higher-order desires match, whereas in the secret condition (1b) the character’s basic 
preferences and higher-order desires are in conflict.  
 
1. a. Helen doesn’t care who knows that she dislikes vegetables.  
 b. Helen is very secretive about the fact that she dislikes vegetables.  
 
The second sentence described the character performing an action that is consistent with 
the context described in the first sentence. For example, in a context such as (1a) Helen would 
behave in accordance with her personal preferences and appropriately eat something other than 
vegetables such as meat (2a). In contrast, in a context such as (1b) Helen would adapt her 
behaviour to fit with her desire to keep personal preferences a secret and would therefore eat 
vegetables (2b). Participants heard the second sentence while a visual display was presented 
which included images that were consistent with the character’s two possible choices of action. 
Although one can predict the appropriate action based on the contextual information given in the 
first sentence, Ferguson & Breheny (2011) argue that both conditions involve higher-order ToM 
reasoning as the character’s action is not only based on their basic preference but their desires 
concerning how they want to be viewed by others. Moreover, they observe that the secret 
condition may be more demanding as the character’s basic preference (Helen’s dislike of 
vegetables) and their high-order intention of keeping this preference a secret, are in conflict. This 
means that since both the basic preference and higher-order desires of the character are equally 
salient, when predicting the character’s action, a participant has to ignore any predictions that are 
based on the character’s basic preference and they have to make both inferences in order to make 
a correct prediction. While in the open condition, basic preferences and intentions point to the 




2.      a. When Helen goes to dinner parties she makes a show of eating meat.  
      b. When Helen goes to dinner parties she makes a show of eating vegetables.   
 
The results from adult participants in Ferguson and Breheny (2011) showed that very 
early on in the linguistic stimulus a difference in visual bias emerged between conditions, despite 
the fact that the character’s basic preference was the same in both contexts. That is, participants 
exploited information about both of the character’s higher-order desires to predict the target prior 
to disambiguating information in both conditions. However, the bias in the secret condition was 
slightly delayed in comparison to the open condition as participants only showed a preference to 
the target from the post-ambiguous noun region (the offset of ‘dinner parties’ and onset of 
‘makes a show’), suggesting that character’s basic preferences influenced expectations.     
The ‘secrets’ paradigm is well suited to address the question raised above since adults’ 
gaze shows they are successful in rapidly generating predictions using high-order ToM 
reasoning. In addition, according to Ferguson & Breheny (2011), the task has an advantage over 
other complex ToM tasks in that it avoids interference from the ‘curse of knowledge’ (Birch & 
Bloom, 2007). This is a state of affairs in which participants in a task has a more informed 
perspective than the other person, i.e. there is conflicting knowledge from the self-perspective 
grounded in the actual state of affairs. The secrets paradigm involves stories that require 
participants to reason about others’ behaviour based on shared knowledge about ‘reality’ and 
personal preferences, without conflict from the linguistic input or knowledge from the self-
perspective. Because the task reduces these demands on IC and other executive mechanisms 
while at the same time involving more complex, higher-order ToM inferences, we can explore 
the development of ToM abilities from a different perspective to the Director task and the False 
Belief Task. As in Experiment 1, participants’ IC and verbal WM abilities were measured. These 
measures will not only control for individual differences in executive function abilities but they 
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Fifty-two participants took part in this study, of which 17 were adults (24-36 years old, M = 
27.32, SD = 3.57), 18 were older adolescents (14-18 years old, M = 16.70, SD = 1.39), and 17 
were younger adolescents (9-13.9 years old, M = 11.81, SD = 1.43). Of these, 29 participants 
also took part in Experiment 1 (11 adults, 12 older adolescents, and 6 younger adolescents), in a 
separate testing session. Younger participants were included in this experiment than in 
Experiment 1 to allow us to investigate whether developmental differences may be limited to late 
childhood/early adolescence. The sample size for each group is comparable to the sample size 
per experiment in Altmann and Kamide (1999), and the total sample size exceeds that used in 
Ferguson and Breheny (2011)4. All were native English speakers, and were recruited and gave 
informed consent in the same manner as Experiment 1.  
 
Stimuli and design 
Secrets task  The task design and stimuli were based on that used in Ferguson and Breheny 
(2011). The experiment employed a 2 x 3 mixed design, with context (open vs secret) as the 
within-participant factor, and age group (adult vs older adolescent vs younger adolescent) as the 
between-participants factor. Stimuli consisted of 16 sets of experimental pictures with their 
respective auditory description in one of two conditions, and were adapted from those used in 
Ferguson and Breheny (2011).  
                                                
4 Note that a post-hoc power calculation showed that a minimum of 100 participants (calculated using the simr 
package in R; Green & MacLeod, 2016) would have been needed to detect a significant 2-way interaction with the 
significance level of α=.05 on 80% of occasions (as suggested by Cohen, 1988). The current sample sizes yield an 
estimated power of 51% for Experiment 2. We discuss this limitation further in the General Discussion. 
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Table 5 shows an example of the experimental auditory stimuli and Figure 4 shows the 
corresponding visual display. Each visual stimulus contained four images: Character, Open 
referent (pink car), Secret referent (green car), and an irrelevant distractor object. The position of 
the four different types of pictures differed across items to prevent participants from creating 
viewing strategies. The auditory stimulus for each item consisted of two sentences. In the first 
sentence a fact about the story character (e.g. Tom’s favourite colour is pink) was introduced 
within an open or a secret context.  Sentence two described an event (e.g. buying a new car) and 
referred to an object that was consistent with the character’s open or secret intentions. All 
character’s actions described in the second sentence were consistent with their higher order 
intentions (i.e. to be open/secretive about their personal preferences). 
  









Tom is always telling people that his favourite colour is pink  
Last week Tom bought a new car and he deliberately chose a pink car. 
 
Secret 
Tom does not want anyone to know that his favourite colour is pink. 














Figure 4 Example visual stimulus used in Experiment 2.  
 
One version of each item was assigned to one of two lists and participants were randomly 
assigned to one of these lists. Each list contained 16 unique experimental items, eight in each 
condition (open and secret context). Sixteen filler trials, using similar visual stimuli but no 
mental state inference, were randomly distributed in each list. Half the trials were followed by a 
binary comprehension question to ensure participants were paying attention (e.g. ‘What type of 
vehicles were pictured? Convertibles < > Trucks’).  
 
Individual measures  As in Experiment 1, inhibitory control was measured through a simple and 
complex Go-NoGo task (accuracy and median correct response time), and verbal working 





Participants were tested individually and completed the tasks (secrets, Go-NoGo, Digit Span) in 
a single session of approximately 45 minutes. The secrets task was always administered first, and 
procedures for presenting stimuli and recording eye movements was the same as in Experiment 
1. 
For the secrets task participants were given the following instructions as in Ferguson & 
Breheny (2011): “In this experiment you will hear short spoken passages and during the second 
sentence a picture will also be displayed. We are interested in how the pictures help you 
understand the spoken language”. A centrally-located fixation cross was presented at the 
beginning of each trial, and the trial was initiated when participants successfully fixated it for at 
least 1s without blinking. The fixation cross remained on the screen while participants heard the 
first sentence. The target picture was then presented, and after a 1000ms preview the relevant 
audio for sentence 2 was initiated. The picture remained on screen for 9s and sentence 2 ended 
approximately 1-2s before the end of the trial.  
 
Eye-tracking data processing and analysis 
Participant’s eye movements were tracked while the target picture was on screen, and were 
processed on a trial-by-trial basis relative to the respective image and sound onsets.  For each 
image, four ROIs were specified around each object (Character, Open referent, Secret referent 
and Distractor). Any looks outside these areas were coded as background.  
The data was then broken down into 20ms time bins and within each bin samples were 
binary coded as ‘1’ if they belonged to an ROI and ‘0’ if there were no looks on the ROIs. These 
samples were aggregated across participants and items to calculate visual preferences to the open 
referent and the secret referent for five consecutive time windows: i) [ambiguous noun] (e.g. 
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“car”), ii) [post-ambiguous noun], iii) [adverb] (e.g. “deliberately”), iv) [transitive verb] (e.g. 
“choose”), and v) [disambiguating noun] (e.g. “pink”). Table 6 shows the average durations per 
condition for the word-based time windows.  
 








For each time-window a referent-preference score was calculated, as in Experiment 1 
using: log(Open/Secret) = ln (P(Open) / P(Secret)).  P(Open) refers to the sum of looks to the open 
referent divided by the total number looks to all ROIs, and P(Secret) is the sum of looks to the 
secret referent divided by the total number of looks to all ROIs. The output is symmetrical 
around zero, with positive scores suggesting a higher proportion of looks to the open referent, 
and negative scores indicating a higher proportion of looks to the secret referent. Note that for 
statistical analysis eye movements were synchronised to the absolute word onsets and offsets on 
a trial-by-trial basis. The grand mean for the log-transformed referent bias score was plotted to 
visualise the data (Figure 5), with eye movements resynchronized according to individual word 
onsets (Altmann & Kamide, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2015).    
 
 Open Secret 
[ambiguous noun] 534 541 
[post-ambiguous noun] 480 502 
[adverb] 825 836 
[transitive verb] 597 612 

















Figure 5 The average log(open/secret) score for each condition and age group. Positive scores show a greater bias to look at the open referent and 
negative scores show a greater bias to look at the secret referent. Note that the dashed and vertical lines indicate absolute onsets and average offsets 



















Statistical analyses were carried out with mixed effect regression models for each time 
window separately: i) [ambiguous noun], ii) [post-ambiguous noun], iii) [adverb], iv) [transitive 
verb], and v) [disambiguating noun].  The models were fitted using the ‘lmer’ function in R, and 
the referent-bias score was the dependent variable. Each model included context (Open vs 
Secret) as a fixed effect, deviation coded as .5 vs -.5, respectively. Age group was also a fixed 
effect, and was entered using two deviation coded contrast schemes: Contrast 1 = Adult (1), 
Older Adolescent (-.5), Younger Adolescent (-.5); Contrast 2 = Adult (0), Older Adolescent (.5), 
Younger Adolescent (-.5). This contrast coding allowed us to compare the adult group with both 
adolescent groups together (Contrast 1), and compare the older adolescent group with the 
younger adolescent group without the adult group (Contrast 2). Where post-hoc analyses were 
required to follow up on significant interactions, models were re-levelled to include the condition 
of interest as the reference level. Models used the maximal random effects structure, including 
random effects for participants and items, and crossed random slopes for context by group on 
items and a random slope for context on participants. Random effects were only removed where 
they lead to non-convergence due to overparameterisation. As in Experiment 1, significant 
effects of context were followed up for each time window using one sample t-tests to test 
whether the fixation bias for each context condition was significantly different from zero, which 
would indicate when participants showed a significant preference to fixate the open or secret 
referent. All tests used a significance level of 5%.  
       
Results 
Eye-tracking results 
Table 7 shows the fixed and random effects for the model adopted in each time window. Table 8 
shows the statistical results from the planned one-sample t-tests for each condition in each time 
window where there was a significant effect of condition.    
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Table 7 Estimates and t-values for each time window of interest, where * p < .05 and *** p < .001.  
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	  
Intercept Context 
Age group 1: 
Adults vs 
Adolescents 
Age group 2: 
Young vs Older 
Adolescents 
Context x 
Age group 1 
Context x Age 
group 2 
Ambiguous noun 
β Est. (SE) .17 (.14) .35 (.18) -.16 (.14) .10 (.24) .57 (.26) -.14 (.46) 
t-value 1.27 1.95 -1.13 .40 2.23 * -.32 
Post-ambiguous noun 
β Est. (SE) .09 (.12) .13 (.17) -.06 (.13) -.08 (.22) .38 (.25) .40 (.43) 
t-value .80 .73 -.47 -.36 1.55 .92 
Adverb 
β Est. (SE) .13 (.17) .34 (.20) -.30 (.16) .01 (.27) -.21 (.28) .18 (.50) 
t-value .81 1.70 -1.91 .01 -.74 .36 
Transitive verb 
β Est. (SE) .13 (.18) .64 (.19) .01 (.18) -.18 (.30) -.51 (.27) .63 (.50) 
t-value .74 3.33 *** .02 .58 -1.87 1.29 
Disambiguating noun 
β Est. (SE) .04 (.15) 1.93 (.19) .08 (.13) .13 (.23) -.23 (.26) .62 (.47) 
t-value .29 10.37 *** .62 .56 -.87 1.32 







Table 8 One sample t-test results for each condition and time window where there was a 










Analyses during the ambiguous noun (e.g. “car”) showed no significant effect of Age 
group (all p’s > .22), and a non-significant trend for Context (p = .052). Crucially however, 
there was a significant interaction between Context and Age group 1 (adult vs both adolescent 
groups) in this time window. Follow-up analyses tested the effect of context in each age 
group, and revealed significantly different biases in Open and Secret contexts in the adult 
group (Est. = .92, SE = .31, t = 2.97, p = .005), reflecting a significant bias to fixate the open 
referent within an open context, and a non-significant trend to fixate the secret referent within 
a secret context (see Table 8). In contrast, the adolescents (young and old combined) showed 
no difference between the two context conditions (Est. = .07, SE = .25, t = .28, p = .778), and 
no significant bias to either referent during secret or open trials (Table 8). The Context x Age 
Group 2 (younger vs older adolescent groups) interaction was not significant in this time 
window, showing that visual biases were equivalent between younger and older adolescents.  
Analyses in the post-ambiguous noun (“and he”) and adverb (“deliberately”) time 
windows showed no significant effects or interactions. However, by the transitive verb 
  df t-value p-value 
Ambiguous noun     
 Adult    
    Open 16 2.51 .02 * 
    Secret 16 -1.87 .08 
     
 Adolescent    
    Open 34 1.71 .10 
    Secret 34 1.41 .17 
Transitive verb     
    Open 51 2.73 .009 ** 
    Secret 51 -1.21 .23 
Disambiguating noun     
    Open  51       6.86    < .001 *** 
    Secret 51 -8.62 < .001 *** 
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(“chose”), analyses showed a significant effect of context, but no effects of Age group or any 
significant interactions. The post-hoc t-tests indicate that here, all participants showed a 
significant bias to the open referent within an open context but did not show a preference 
between open and secret referents in the secret context (see Table 8). During the 
disambiguating noun time window (“pink/green car”), there was a significant effect of 
context and no other effects or significant interactions (all p’s > .24). Post-hoc t-tests revealed 
that all participants showed significant visual biases to the appropriate referent (i.e. the open 
referent during the open context and the secret referent during the secret context).  
To summarise, the eye movement data suggest that adults successfully used 
contextual information about the character’s higher order desires to distinguish open and 
secret actions as soon as they heard the ambiguous noun (e.g. “car”). They correctly 
anticipated reference to the open referent in the open condition (i.e. the pink car) but 
crucially, they also correctly anticipated reference to the secret reference in the secret 
condition (i.e. the green car). This suggests that adults not only showed a sensitivity to the 
different contexts but used that information about the character’s intentions to make 
predictions. The weaker effect found in this adult group during the secret trials is consistent 
with results from Ferguson et al. (2012). However, neither adolescent group seemed to show 
sensitivity to the context until much later, during the transitive verb (“choose”) which 
precedes the disambiguating words, suggesting that they do not make inferences about the 
perspective of the characters early on, like adults do.  
 
Individual differences results 
Results for one way ANOVAs of all individual measures are shown in Table 9. The three age 
groups did not differ in either the simple or complex IC measures (all p’s > .21). However, 
the Digit Span task revealed a significant difference in working memory between age groups, 
36	
	
with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons revealing that younger adolescents 
performed worse than older adolescents (p = .05) and adults (p = .003), but that older 




Table 9 Means and standard deviations of all executive function measure scores and their respective one way ANOVA results, where ** p < .01. 
       Mean (SD) ANOVA 
  Adult Older Adolescent Younger Adolescent df F 
Inhibitory 
control  
Simple Go NoGo (Acc) -.05 (.72) -.08 (.14) -.11 (.13) 2, 49 .95 
Complex Go NoGo (Acc) -.21 (.16) -.24 (.15) -.32 (.22) 2, 49 1.59 
Simple Go (RT) 387 (19) 383 (47) 403 (56) 2, 49 1.01 
Complex Go (RT) 429 (50) 425 (53) 453 (72) 2, 49 1.14 
 
 
     
Working 
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To further examine whether individual differences in IC or WM had an effect on 
anticipatory looks to the correct target, and whether this differs depending on whether the 
character intended to be open or secretive about their personal preference, Pearson 
correlations were performed separately for each condition between the average bias score 
during the ambiguous noun and participants’ computed z-scores for IC (simple and complex 
accuracy) and WM. Correlations were conducted for the ambiguous noun region (Figure 7) 
because this is where the first evidence of context effects emerged in this study and Ferguson 
& Breheny (2011), and age-group differences were found here. In addition, we conducted 
correlations for the entire anticipatory window (from the ambiguous word until onset of 
disambiguating word). As in Experiment 1, we did not run correlations using the median Go 
response times since responses on Go trials do not require inhibitory control. The significance 
level for each test was corrected for the six correlations using Bonferoni correction (pcrit = 
.0083). Results showed that there were no significant correlations for any of the individual 
measures and the bias score in either condition in the ambiguous noun region (all p’s > .11) 







   
 
Figure 7 Correlations between participants’ anticipatory bias score (y-axis) and scores from 
each individual measure (x-axis), separately for the open (blue) and secret (orange) condition. 
 
Discussion	
Results from Experiment 2 showed that adults anticipated the appropriate target long 
before disambiguating information was presented (i.e. in the ambiguous ‘car’ region) in both 
the open condition, when there was no conflict between the character’s basic preferences and 







































































character’s basic preference and high-order intentions. This pattern is in line with Ferguson 
and Breheny (2011)’s findings. Crucially, younger and older adolescents showed a delay in 
anticipating the target in both conditions, as distinct gaze biases for open and secret 
conditions only emerged in the region immediately preceding the disambiguating information 
(i.e. during ‘chose’).  
 Additional analyses of individual difference characteristics showed that while the 
younger adolescents had poorer verbal WM than the older groups, there was no age-related 
differences between older adolescents’ and adults’ inhibitory control and verbal working 
memory performance. Thus, older adolescents were delayed relative to adults at anticipating 
the character’s actions despite comparable IC and verbal WM. None of the individual 
measures correlated with anticipation, reflected in eye-gaze data. 
 
General Discussion 
In this paper, we have presented two visual-world studies involving adolescent and adult 
groups. The studies were designed to measure incremental formation of participants’ 
expectations about a character’s actions, given background information about their beliefs 
and desires. The studies differed in terms of the social complexity of the scenarios, reflected 
in the order of belief-desire reasoning required. In our first experiment, the character acts on a 
simple first-order belief about an object’s location, which could be true or false. In our 
second experiment, the character is portrayed has having a first-order preference and a 
second-order preference about what other people believe about that preference (i.e. a third-
order mental state representation). Conditions differ in terms of whether the character prefers 
people to know about the first-order preference, or not. In both experiments, we successfully 
replicated previous findings with adult groups (Ferguson et al., 2015b; Ferguson & Breheny, 
2011). In both cases, adults were found to show sensitivity to a character’s mental states 
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when anticipating their actions, in the earliest time region (i.e. they distinguished 
expectations for the character’s behaviour based on true and false beliefs in Experiment 1, 
and based on first-order desires and an intention to deceive in Experiment 2).  
 Previous visual-world research has examined incremental anticipation of others’ 
mental states in older adolescents versus adults using a version of the Director task, the triples 
task. This task is well known to be challenging even for adults, while other versions of the 
Director task are less so. Specifically, the triples task compounds the ‘pull of reality’ 
demands imposed by other versions of the Director task, with an additional demand of 
ignoring attraction to the distractor object due to ‘bottom up’ linguistic processes (Heller et 
al., 2016). Previous comparisons have shown that adolescents, including older adolescents, 
are less likely to take the perspective of the director into account than adults. Differences in 
outcomes between older children and adolescents, and adults on the triples director task 
appears to be partly accounted by differences in executive function abilities, which are 
required to a larger degree in the triples Director task (Symeonidou et al., 2016). A change-
of-location false-belief task, like less demanding pairs versions of the Director task, requires 
only that participants ignore the ‘pull of reality’ and hence poses lesser executive function 
demands. Our aim with our first experiment was to determine whether, given the lower 
demands of a change-of-location false-belief task, but comparable first-order mental state 
inferences, adolescents would show anticipation in the same timecourse as adults. 
Experiment 1 showed that, in fact, adolescents’ gaze discriminated between True and False 
belief conditions more robustly than adults in early time regions (i.e. the pre-object region).  
 Our assumptions about the stimuli in Experiment 2’s secrets task was that EF 
demands are relatively low, in spite of the social complexity of the scenarios being described 
(Ferguson & Breheny, 2011). The results of the second experiment supports this assumption. 
Here we found no correlation between either measure of inhibitory control or verbal working 
42	
	
memory and anticipation. In particular, there was an absence of correlation even in the 
‘secret’ condition, where the character’s first-order and higher-order preferences were in 
conflict. This absence is consistent with widespread thinking about previous Theory of Mind 
research, which sees EF demands stemming from factors like the ‘pull of reality’ (Birch & 
Bloom 2007; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012), response demands (Setoh et al., 2016; Wang et al., 
2016) or interference from bottom-up linguistic processes (Hannah et al., 2003; Heller et al., 
2016). Though these factors have been argued to affect outcomes in false-belief and Director 
tasks none are present in the secrets task.  
 Participants in Experiment 2 were presented with a character who has a preference 
that is potentially less than socially acceptable. This character is either untroubled about other 
people knowing about that preference, or does not want other people to know. The visual 
world paradigm used in this study is a useful way to measure the timecourse in which 
participants can integrate the incoming linguistic stimulus with background contextual 
knowledge to generate expectations about upcoming discourse. Replicating previous results, 
we found that our adult group showed clear anticipation of the likely course of events at the 
earliest possible point in the linguistic input. The adolescents also showed some anticipation 
of the character’s response before disambiguation. These results therefore provide evidence 
for an ability to make mental state inferences based on complex desires and intentions in late 
childhood and adolescence. 
However, neither adolescent group displayed anticipation until much later in the 
target sentence. We can conclude from these results that the younger age groups are delayed 
in predicting outcomes, compared to adults. Based on a comparison between the older 
adolescent group and adults, we cannot directly attribute these differences to differences in 
EF abilities. While we took into account differences in working memory and inhibitory 
control, adolescent and adult groups may differ in other ways that may have affected their 
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performance on the task, which is a limitation of this research. For example, performance of 
adolescents and adults on reasoning tasks can be differently affected by the presence of an 
experimenter (Wolf et al., 2015), and language development continues throughout childhood, 
adolescence and adulthood (Nippold, 2006). Moreover, these more socially complex 
scenarios may lead to more uncertainty for adolescents, in terms of what they expect the 
character to do. One possibility is that adolescents and adults differ in the organisation and 
availability of task relevant information.  For example, adults have richer networks of 
associations, and clearer biases, given social contextual cues. Another possibility is that 
adolescents generate less well-defined outcomes for scenarios than adults, due to differences 
in weightings of prior probabilities (buying a pink car vs. green), and uncertainty about 
background mental states, given observed behaviour.5 Viewing the results in these terms, 
future research could examine to what extent adolescents are able to appreciate that others’ 
behaviours often result from complex, conflicting motivation. The development of this ability 
to deal with conflicting desires and mental states may parallel the prolonged development of 
the understanding and experience of mixed emotions (e.g., Burkitt, Watling, & Cocks, 2019; 
Larsen, To, & Fireman, 2007).   
 This finding of a developmental difference in mental states inference between 
adolescents and adults is in line with neuroimaging studies showing continued development 
of the ‘social brain’ during adolescence (Blakemore, 2008). Our results indeed reveal that 
ToM has not reached full maturity by adolescence; younger and older adolescents were 
                                                
5 For example, a Bayesian model of a participant’s expectation for an outcome where the agent buys the green 
car (og) or a pink car (op), given either ‘out and proud’ or ‘secretive’ context, Co or Cs, might see the distribution 
as a function of the likelihood of C, given observed behaviour and the prior probability as follows: 
 
i. P(o|C) ∝ P(C|o).P(o) 
 
Successful anticipation of the more socially acceptable green-car choice, given a ‘secretive’ context would stem 
from an awareness both of a greater prior probability of socially acceptable behaviour (P(og) > P(op)) and of a 
sensitivity to the fact that observed behaviour often results as a compromise between complex, conflicting 
desires (P(Cs|og) > P(Cs|op)). This discussion assumes a crudely simple analysis of a more complex state of 
affairs. See Goodman et al. (2006) and Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum (2009) for discussion.	
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delayed relative to adults in anticipating the target in scenarios that required complex mental 
state reasoning (Experiment 2). Importantly, while previous research on adolescent social 
development has found that EF abilities can be a significant factor in accounting for 
differences between children, adolescent and adult groups on tasks that call on ToM (Mills et 
al., 2015; Symeonidou et al., 2016), the current age groups differences were not accounted 
for by difference in simple or complex inhibitory control, or verbal working memory. Our 
findings therefore are strong evidence of prolonged maturation of social reasoning about 
complex mental states.  
Nevertheless, we acknowledge the potential limitation of sample size; we simply may 
not have had sufficient power to accurately detect the age group x belief/context interaction 
effects in our experiments. In the current study, detecting a significant interaction with the 
significance level of α=.05 on 80% of occasions (as suggested by Cohen, 1988) would have 
needed a minimum of 90 participants for Experiment 1, and 100 for Experiment 2 (calculated 
using the simr package in R; Green & MacLeod, 2016). It would have been very challenging 
to recruit and test these high numbers of participants, using the complex eye-tracking 
methods we used. The current sample sizes yield an estimated power of 41% for Experiment 
1, and 51% for Experiment 2. While the lower sample sizes are somewhat mitigated by the 
use of linear mixed models where analyses control for both by-participant and by-item 
variation rather than aggregated across participants (thus improving power; Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008), nevertheless the power calculations noted above are based on this 
analysis approach. More importantly, the results in the adult group broadly replicated the 
patterns seen in the experiments that we sought to replicate (Ferguson et al., 2015; Ferguson 
& Breheny, 2011), meaning that we can feel relatively confident that the reported findings are 
reliable. As a field, research on adolescent cognitive development should continue to aim for 
larger sample sizes.  
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 Regarding the EF demands of the tasks reported in this paper, when correcting for 
multiple comparisons, we found no significant correlation overall between performance on 
the complex-IC task and the false-belief trials in Experiment 1. We note however that 
previous research finds that change-of-location FB tasks pose a ‘pull of reality’ challenge due 
to the location of the mentioned object being different to the target location (). It is interesting 
that any EF demands of this FB task did not result in a change of outcome, in terms of the 
timecourse of anticipation, between adolescents and adults. We can attribute this to the fact 
that demands of FB tasks are not that great, compared perhaps to the more demanding triples 
versions of the Director task. Whether a no-difference outcome would emerge between 
groups whose EF scores actually differ is a question we leave to another time.  
Moreover, results of Experiment 2 provide very clear evidence that factors outside of 
EF differences can lead to differences in outcomes between groups of adolescents and adults. 
As mentioned, we found no relation between anticipation and any EF measure. The older 
adolescent group in this experiment did not differ to adults on these measures, and yet 
outcomes were markedly different. These results are in line with views emerging in the 
literature on older children and adolescents that there is more to social cognitive development 
than simply differences in EF (Bradford, Brunsdon, & Ferguson, in press; Brunsdon, 
Bradford, & Ferguson, in press; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2018). Our results 
indicate ways forward for adolescent social-cognitive research which are sensitive to EF 
abilities but which probe responses to more complex events, and the biases and expectations 




Altmann, G.T., & Kamide, Y. (2009). Discourse-mediation of the mapping between language 




Anderson P. (2002). Assessment and development of executive function (EF) during 
childhood. Child Neuropsychology, 8, 71-82. 
Apperly, I.A., Riggs, K.J., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C., & Samson, D. (2006). Is Belief 
Reasoning Automatic? Psychological Science, 17, 841–844.  
Back, E., & Apperly, I.A. (2010). Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true 
and false-belief ascription. Cognition, 115(1), 54–70.  
Baker, C.L., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. (2009). Action understanding as inverse planning. 
Cognition, 113(3), 329–349. 
Barr, D.J. (2008). Pragmatic expectations and linguistic evidence: Listeners anticipate but do 
not integrate common ground. Cognition, 109(1), 18–40.  
Barr, D.J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. (2013). Random-effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 
68, 255–278. 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects 
Models Using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1–48.  
Begeer, S., Bernstein, D.M., Aßfalg, A., Azdad, H., Glasbergen, T., Wierda, M., & Koot, 
H.M. (2016). Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism 
spectrum disorders. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 149, 134–145.  
Birch, S.A.J., & Bloom, P. (2007). The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false-beliefs. 
Psychological Science, 18, 382–386. 
Blakemore, S.-J. (2008). The social brain in adolescence. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(4), 
267–277. 
Bradford, E., Brunsdon, V., & Ferguson, H.J. (in press). The neural basis of belief-attribution 
across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect. Cortex. 
47	
	
Bradford, E.E.F., Jentzsch, I., Gomez, J-C. (2015). From Self to Social Cognition: Theory of 
Mind Mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning. Cognition, 138, 21–34. 
Bradford, E., Jentzsch, I., Gomez, J., Chen, Y., Zhang, D., & Su, Y. (2018). Cross-Cultural 
Differences in Adult Theory of Mind Abilities: A Comparison of Native-English 
Speakers and Native-Chinese Speakers on the Self/Other Differentiation Task. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71, 2665–2676. 
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2009). The role of executive function in perspective taking during online 
language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(5), 893–900.  
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2012). Beyond common and privileged: Gradient representations of 
common ground in real-time language use. Language and Cognitive Processes, 27(1), 
62–89.  
Brown-Schmidt, S., Gunlogson, C., & Tanenhaus, M.K. (2008). Addressees distinguish 
shared from private information when interpreting questions during interactive 
conversation, 107(3), 1122–1134. 
Brown-Schmidt, S., & Hanna, J. (2011). Talking in another persons shoes: Incremental 
perspective-taking in language processing. Dialogue & Discourse, 2(1), 11–33.  
Brunsdon, V., Bradford, E., & Ferguson, H.J. (in press). Sensorimotor mu rhythm during 
action observation changes across the lifespan independently from social cognitive 
processes. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience.  
Bull, R., Phillips, L.H., & Conway, C.A. (2008). The role of control functions in mentalizing: 
Dual-task studies of theory of mind and executive function. Cognition, 107, 663–672. 
Burkitt, E., Watling, D., & Cocks, F. (2019). Mixed emotion experiences for self or another 
person in adolescence. Journal of Adolescence, 75, 63–72. 
Cane, J., Ferguson, H.J., & Apperly, I.A. (2017). Using perspective to resolve reference: the 
48	
	
impact of cognitive load and motivation. Journal Of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, And Cognition, 43, 591–610.  
Carlson, S.M., Moses, L.J., & Breton, C. (2002). How specific is the relation between 
executive function and theory of mind? Contributions of inhibitory control and working 
memory. Infant and Child Development, 11, 73–92. 
Carlson, S.M., Moses, L.J., & Claxton, L.J. (2004). Individual differences in executive 
functioning and theory of mind: An investigation of inhibitory control and planning 
ability. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 87, 299–319. 
Cohen, J. (1988). The effect size index: d. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral 
sciences, 2, 284–288. 
Cohen, A.S., & German, T.C. (2009). Encoding of others’ beliefs without overt instruction. 
Cognition, 111, 356–363. 
Conklin, H.M., Luciana, M., Hooper, C.J., & Yarger, R.S. (2007). Working memory 
performance in typically developing children and adolescents: behavioral evidence of 
protracted frontal lobe development. Developmental Neuropsychology, 31(1), 103–28.  
Davis, M.H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113–
126. 
Davis, H.L., & Pratt, C. (1996). The development of children’s theory of mind: The working 
memory explanation. Australian Journal of Psychology, 47, 25–31. 
Diamond, A. (2013). Executive functions. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 135–168. 
Diamond, A. (2002). Normal development of prefrontal cortex from birth toyoung adulthood: 
cognitive functions, anatomy, and biochemistry. In Principles of frontal lobe function 
(D.T. Stuss, pp. 446–503). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dumontheil, I. (2015). Development of the social brain during adolescence. Psicología 
49	
	
Educativa, 21(2), 117–124.  
Dumontheil, I., Apperly, I.A., & Blakemore, S.J. (2010). Online usage of theory of mind 
continues to develop in late adolescence. Developmental Science, 13, 331–338.  
Dumontheil, I., Roggeman, C., Ziermans, T., Peyrard-Janvid, M., Matsson, H., Kere, J., & 
Klingberg, T. (2011). Influence of the COMT genotype on working memory and brain 
activity changes during development. Biological Psychiatry, 70(3), 222–229.  
Epley, N., Morewedge, C.K., & Keysar, B. (2004). Perspective taking in children and adults: 
Equivalent egocentrism but differential correction. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 40(6), 760–768. 
Ferguson, H.J., Apperly, I., Ahmad, J., Bindemann, M., & Cane, J. (2015b). Task constraints 
distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation 
in a false-belief task, 139, 50–70. 
Ferguson, H.J., & Breheny, R. (2011). Eye movements reveal the time-course of anticipating 
behaviour based on complex, conflicting desires. Cognition, 119(2), 179–196.  
Ferguson, H.J., & Breheny, R. (2012). Listeners’ eyes reveal spontaneous sensitivity to 
others’ perspectives. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(1), 257–263.  
Ferguson, H.J., Cane, J.E., Douchkov, M., & Wright, D. (2015b). Empathy predicts false-
belief reasoning ability: evidence from the N400. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 10(6), 848–55.  
Ferguson, H.J., Scheepers, C., & Sanford, A. (2010). Expectations in counterfactual and 
theory of mind reasoning. Language and Cognitive Processes, 25, 297–346. 
Garon, N., Bryson, S.E., & Smith, I.M. (2008). Executive function in preschoolers: A review 
using an integrative framework. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 31–60.  
Gathercole, S.E., Pickering, S.J., Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of 
50	
	
working memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40, 177–190. 
Geangu, E., Gibson, A., Kaduk, K., & Reid, V.M. (2013). The neural correlates of passively 
viewed sequences of true and false-beliefs. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 
8, 432–437. 
German, T.P., & Hehman, J.A. (2006). Representational and executive selection resourses in 
‘theory of mind’: Evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age. 
Cognition, 101, 129–152. 
Goodman, N.D., Baker, C.L., Bonawitz, E.B., Mansinghka, V.K., Gopnik, A., Wellman, H., 
et al. (2006). Intuitive theories of mind: A rational approach to false belief. In 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 
(pp. 1382–1390). 
Green, P., & MacLeod, C. J. (2016). SIMR: an R package for power analysis of generalized 
linear mixed models by simulation. Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 7(4), 493–498. 
Hanna, J.E., Tanenhaus, M.K., & Trueswell, J.C. (2003). The effects of common ground and 
perspective on domains of referential interpretation. Journal of Memory and Language, 
49(1), 43–61.  
Happé, F.G.E. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story 
characters’ thoughts and feelings by able, mentally handicapped and normal children. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, 129–154. 
Heller, D., Grodner, D. & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2008) The Role of Perspective in Identifying 
Domains of Reference. Cognition, 108, 831–836. 
Heller, D., Parisien, C. & Stevenson, S. (2016) Perspective-taking behavior as the 
probabilistic weighing of multiple domains. Cognition, 149, 104–120.  
Heyes, C. (2014). Submentalizing: I am not really reading your mind. Perspectives in 
Psychological Science, 9, 131–143. 
51	
	
Humphrey G, Dumontheil I. (2016). Development of risk-taking, perspective-taking, and 
inhibitory control during adolescence. Developmental Neuropsychology.  41:59-76. 
Keulers, E.H.H., Evers, E.A.T., Stiers, P., & Jolles, J. (2010). Age, sex, and pubertal phase 
influence mentalizing about emotions and actions in adolescents. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 35, 555–569. 
Keysar, B., Barr, D.J., Balin, J.A., & Brauner, J.S. (2000). Taking perspective in 
conversation: The Role of Mutual Knowledge in Comprehension, 11(1), 32–38. 
Keysar, B., Lin, S., & Barr, D. J. (2003). Limits on theory of mind use in adults. Cognition, 
89(1), 25–41.  
Larsen, J. T., To, Y. M., & Fireman, G. (2007). Children’s understanding and experience of 
mixed emotions. Psychological Science, 18(2), 186–191.  
Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2010). Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to 
interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 46(3), 551–556.  
Luna, B., Garver, K.E., Urban, T.A, Lazar, N.A, & Sweeney, J.A. (2004). Maturation of 
cognitive processes from late childhood to adulthood. Child Development, 75(5), 1357–
72.  
McKinnon, M.C., & Moscovitch, M. (2007). Domain-general contributions to social 
reasoning: Theory of mind and deontic reasoning reexplored. Cognition, 102, 179–218. 
Meinhardt, J., Kühn-Popp, N., Sommer, M., & Sodian, B. (2012). Distinct neural correlates 
underlying pretense and false-belief reasoning: evidence from ERPs. NeuroImage, 63, 
623–631. 
Mills, K.L., Dumontheil, I., Speekenbrink, M., & Blakemore, S-J. (2015). Multitasking 
during social interactions in adolescence and early adulthood. Royal Society Open 
52	
	
Science, 2(11), 150117. 
Nadig, A. S., & Sedivy, J. C. (2002). Evidence of perspective-taking constraints in children’s 
on-line reference resolution. Psychological Science, 13, 329–336. 
Nielsen, M.K., Slade, L., Levy, J.P., & Holmes, A. (2015). Inclined to see it your way: Do 
altercentric intrusion effects in visual perspective taking reflect an intrinsically social 
process? Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 68, 1931–1951. 
Nippold, M.A. (2006). Language development in school-age children, adolescents and adults. 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics second Edition), p368–373. 
Nilsen, E.S., & Graham, S.A. (2009). The relations between children’s communicative 
perspective-taking and executive functioning. Cognitive Psychology, 58(2), 220–249. 
R Core Development Team. (2013). R: A language and environment for statistical 
computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from 
http://www.r-project.org 
Rubio-Fernández, P. (2016). The director task: A test of Theory-of-Mind use or selective 
attention? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.  
Rubio-Fernández, P. & Geurts, B. (2016). Don't mention the marble! The role of attentional 
processes in false-belief tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7(4), 835–850. 
Rubio-Fernández, P., & Glucksberg, S. (2012). Reasoning about other people’s beliefs: 
Bilinguals have an advantage. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 38(1), 211–217.  
Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Braithwaite, J.J., Andrews, B.J., & Bodley Scott, S.E. (2010). 
Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other 
people see. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 
36, 1255–1266.  
53	
	
Santiesteban, I., Catmur, C., Hopkins, S., Bird, G. & Heyes, C.M. (2014). Avatars and 
arrows: Implicit mentalizing or domain general processing? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 40, 929–937. 
Schneider, D., Bayliss, A.P., Becker, S., & Dux, P.E. (2012). Sustained implicit belief 
processing revealed by eye movements. Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 433–
438. 
Schneider, D., Lam, R., Bayliss, A.P., & Dux, P.E. (2012). Cognitive load disrupts theory of 
mind processing. Psychological Science, 23, 842–847. 
Schneider, D., & Low, J. (2016). Efficient versus flexible mentalizing in complex social 
settings: Exploring signature limits. British Journal of Psychology, 107, 26–29. 
Schneider, D., Slaughter, V.P., & Dux, P.E. (2015). What do we know about implicit false-
belief tracking? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22, 1–12. 
Schneider, D., Slaughter, V.P., & Dux, P.E. (2017). Current evidence for automatic Theory of 
Mind processing in adults. Cognition, 162, 27–31. 
Sebastian, C.L., Fontaine, N.M.G., Bird, G., Blakemore, S.-J., Brito, S. a De, McCrory, E. 
J.P., & Viding, E. (2012). Neural processing associated with cognitive and affective 
Theory of Mind in adolescents and adults. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 
7(1), 53–63.  
Sedivy, J. C., Tanenhaus, M. K., Chambers, C. G., & Carlson, G. N. (1999). Achieving 
incremental processing through contextual representation: Evidence from the processing 
of adjectives. Cognition, 71, 109–147. 
Setoh, P., Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2016). Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a 
traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 113(47), 13360–13365. 
Shamay-Tsoory, S.G., Harari, H., Aharon-Peretz, J., & Levkovitz, Y. (2010). The role of the 
54	
	
orbitofrontal cortex in affective theory of mind deficits in criminal offenders with 
psychopathic tendencies. Cortex, 46(5), 668–677.  
Simmonds, D.J., Pekar, J.J., & Mostofsky, S.H. (2008). Meta-analysis of Go/No-go tasks 
demonstrating that fMRI activation associated with response inhibition is task-
dependent. Neuropsychologia, 46(1), 224–32.  
Surian, L., Surian, L., Caldi, S., Caldi, S., Sperber, D., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of 
beliefs by 13- month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18(7), 580–586. 
Symeonidou, I., Dumontheil, I., Chow, W.-Y., & Breheny, R. (2016). Development of online 
use of theory of mind during adolescence: An eye-tracking study. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 149, 81–97.  
van den Wildenberg, W.P.M., & van der Molen, M.W. (2004). Developmental trends in 
simple and selective inhibition of compatible and incompatible responses. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 87(3), 201–220. 
Vetter, N.C., Altgassen, M., Phillips, L., Mahy, C.E. V, & Kliegel, M. (2013). Development 
of affective theory of mind across adolescence: disentangling the role of executive 
functions. Developmental Neuropsychology, 38(2), 114–25.  
Völlm, B.A., Taylor, A.N., Richardson, P., Corcoran, R., Stirling, J., McKie, S., … Elliot, R. 
(2006). Neuronal correlates of theory of mind and empathy: a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging study in a nonverbal task. NeuroImage, 29(1), 90–98. 
Wang, J.J., Frisson, S., Ali, M. & Apperly, I.A. (2015). Language complexity modulates 8- 
and 10-year-olds' success at using their theory of mind abilities in a communication 
task. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 149, 62–71. 
Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition Manual (3rd ed.). 
San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Wellman, H.M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind 
55	
	
development: the truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–684.  
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining 
function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 
103–128. 
Wolf, L. K., Bazargani, N., Kilford, E. J., Dumontheil, I., & Blakemore, S.-J. (2015). The 
audience effect in adolescence depends on who’s looking over your shoulder. Journal of 
Adolescence, 43, 5–14.  
Wu, S.L., & Keysar, B. (2007). The effect of culture on perspective taking. Psychological 
Science, 18, 600–606.  
Zhao, L., Wang, J.J. & Apperly, I.A. (2018). The cognitive demands of remembering a 
speaker’s perspective and managing common ground size modulate 8- and 10-year-olds’ 
perspective-taking abilities. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 174, 130–149. 
 
 
